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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
SLOVITER, Circuit Judge. 
 
Plaintiff Barbara A. Todish appeals from the District 
Court's order granting summary judgment on statute of 
limitation grounds to defendant CIGNA Corporation 1 in her 
suit for long-term disability insurance benefits. Todish's 
principal argument on appeal is that the District Court 
erred in granting summary judgment because she 
presented sufficient facts from which a reasonable fact 
finder could infer that she was "insane" within the meaning 
of New Jersey Statute 2A:14-21, which permits tolling of 




The underlying facts in this case are largely undisputed. 
Todish began working as a flight attendant for Eastern 
Airlines in 1968. In 1978 she enrolled in the long-term 
disability insurance policy offered by CIGNA through the 
airline. On April 24, 1981, Todish went on medical leave. 
She remained on leave for four years, until April 23, 1985, 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Defendant filed its answer as Connecticut General Life Insurance 
Company "improperly pleaded as CIGNA," and thereafter referred to itself 
as CGLIC. Because the District Court's order refers to it as CIGNA, we 
will do the same. 
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when Eastern Airlines terminated her employment 
pursuant to the collective bargaining agreement providing 
for a maximum four-year period of medical leave. 
 
Todish initially received short-term disability benefits for 
six months. Ultimately, she received long-term disability 
benefits from CIGNA of two additional sums totaling 
approximately $21,800, which covered the remainder of the 
period of her leave from Eastern Airlines until September 
30, 1984. CIGNA included with the final payment a letter, 
dated October 17, 1984, which stated in relevant part: 
 
       As I indicated in my October 4 letter, if you wish to 
       claim benefits beyond September 1984, then you 
       should understand that it is your responsibility to 
       furnish medical proof to support the fact that you are 
       totally disabled from engaging in any form of gainful 
       employment beyond September 30, 1984. 
 
       Again, I am enclosing a form which explains your 
       rights under the Employee Retirement Income Security 
       Act to request a review of your claim. 
 
Appellant's App. at 57 (emphasis in original). Todish did not 
furnish medical proof of her disability or contact CIGNA 
until October 12, 1995, eleven years later, when she wrote 
to CIGNA requesting a reopening of her claim for long-term 
disability benefits. By letter dated October 18, 1995, CIGNA 
informed Todish that it was denying her request because of 
the extended length of time between its denial of continued 
benefits in 1984 and her request to reopen in 1995. CIGNA 
also stated that Todish's file had been destroyed at some 
point during the eleven-year period. 
 
Todish's original applications for Social Security disability 
benefits, filed in 1983 and 1985, were rejected. When she 
was hospitalized in 1990 after an automobile accident, a 
hospital employee recommended that she reapply for Social 
Security disability based on the mental trauma associated 
with the accident. She did, requesting benefits from the 
date of the accident and alleging that she suffered from bi- 
polar disorder since that date. When her claim was denied, 
she requested reconsideration of the denial and retained an 
attorney on a contingency basis for the appeal. In 1993 an 
administrative law judge determined that Todish had been 
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disabled since the 1990 accident, and she was held entitled 
to receive Social Security benefits retroactive to that date. 
 
Todish alleges that she was sent a notice from the Social 
Security Administration that she might also be eligible to 
receive a disability pension from the pension program 
maintained by her former employer, which by then was in 
Chapter 11 proceedings. Todish applied for such a 
disability pension, and in June 1995 the Appeals Board of 
the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation determined that 
Todish was entitled to disability pension benefits from the 
Eastern Airlines plan retroactive to April 23, 1985, the date 
on which her employment was terminated. Pursuant to that 
decision, Todish received $10,943.75 from the Eastern 
Airlines Inc. Retirement Income Plan for Flight Attendants. 
 
As noted above, CIGNA denied Todish's 1995 request to 
reopen her claim for long-term disability insurance benefits 
by letter dated October 18, 1995. Todish commenced this 
action against CIGNA and Eastern Airlines2  on December 7, 
1995, alleging, inter alia, breach of contract and seeking to 
recover at least $5,718.16 in long-term disability benefits 
for the period from the last payment on September 30, 
1984 to her termination on April 24, 1985.3 She also 
alleged that she was entitled to additional payments 
through October 1995 based on language in the insurance 
policy. CIGNA moved for summary judgment, asserting that 
the action was barred by the statute of limitations and the 
equitable doctrine of laches. The District Court granted the 




 We exercise plenary review over the District Court's grant 
of summary judgment. Armbruster v. Unisys Corp. , 32 F.3d 
768, 777 (3d Cir. 1994). Summary judgment should be 
granted where "there is no genuine issue as to any material 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. On May 29, 1996, the parties signed a stipulation dismissing Eastern 
Airlines from the suit. 
 
3. Todish included a claim under ERISA in her handwritten complaint, 
but the case proceeded under a breach of contract theory. 
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fact" and "the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a 
matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). In making this 
determination, we view the facts in the light most favorable 
to the nonmoving party and draw all inferences in that 
party's favor. See Armbruster, 32 F.3d at 777. Even viewing 
the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving 
party, however, the dispute of material fact must be 
"genuine" such that "a reasonable jury could return a 
verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 




The parties agree that the New Jersey six-year statute of 
limitations for breach of contract claims applies to Todish's 
case, and admittedly Todish took no action in response to 
CIGNA's letter within six years of its receipt. Todish argues, 
however, that the statute of limitations should be tolled to 
place her filing within the six-year period because she was 
"insane" within the meaning of New Jersey Statute 2A:14- 
21. 
 
New Jersey Statute 2A:14-21 reads in pertinent part: 
 
       If any person entitled to any of the actions or 
       proceedings specified in sections 2A:14-1 to 2A14-8 
       . . . of this title is or shall be, at the time of any such 
       cause of action or right or title accruing, . . . insane, 
       such person may commence such action or make such 
       entry, within such time as limited by said sections, 
       after his coming to or being of . . . sane mind. 
 
N.J. Stat. Ann. S 2A:14-21. 
 
The New Jersey courts have held that to be "insane" 
within the meaning of the statute, a plaintiff need not suffer 
from a mental illness that requires commitment or 
institutionalization. Sobin v. M. Frisch & Sons , 108 N.J. 
Super. 99, 103-04, 260 A.2d 228, 231 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. 
Div. 1969). Nonetheless, the plaintiff must suffer from 
"such a condition of mental derangement as actually 
prevents the sufferer from understanding his legal rights or 
instituting legal action." Kyle v. Green Acres at Verona, Inc., 
44 N.J. 100, 113, 207 A.2d 513, 521 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1965); 
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see also Sobin, 108 N.J. Super. at 104, 260 A.2d at 231 
(stating that the aim of the tolling statute is"to relieve from 
the strict time restrictions any person who actually lacks 
the ability and capacity, due to mental affliction, to pursue 
his lawful rights."). 
 
There is no question that Todish has a history of mental 
difficulties. According to her testimony in her affidavit, from 
1981 to 1985 she was constantly under treatment by 
psychiatrists. She was hospitalized for mental health 
reasons in 1980 and 1981, and during the period from 
1981 to 1992 she was periodically homeless, occasionally 
suicidal, and held numerous and various jobs for short 
intervals. 
 
However, even drawing all inferences in Todish's favor as 
we are required to do on a motion for summary judgment, 
we conclude that a fact finder could not reasonably infer 
from the evidence presented that Todish's mental 
impairments prevented her from understanding her legal 
rights or instituting legal action during the six-year statute 
of limitations period. We base that conclusion on the 
actions that her own affidavit reveals that she was able to 
take. For example, in 1986 she attempted to hire legal 
counsel to represent her at a grievance hearing in 
connection with her termination at Eastern Airlines. She 
also tried to obtain a transcript of that hearing on two 
occasions and requested information from the union 
representative at the hearing about taking an appeal if the 
result were unfavorable. She applied for Social Security 
benefits in 1983, 1985, and again in 1990. When her 1990 
claim was denied, she sought reconsideration of the denial 
and retained counsel on a contingency basis to represent 
her on appeal. In early 1990 she applied for and was 
accepted to law school.4 And, beginning in 1990, she also 
applied for disability pension benefits from Eastern Airlines, 
persisted in that endeavor and ultimately prevailed. In 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. Although she subsequently failed out of law school, having passed 
only one course in the first semester, her ability to go through the 
application process illustrates a degree of mental awareness that 
undermines her assertion that her mental difficulties rendered her 
unable to understand her legal rights or to institute legal action. 
                                 6 
 
 
addition to Todish's affidavit, evidence submitted by the 
parties at summary judgment also reveals that between 
1987 and 1991, Todish worked as a teacher in three 
community colleges and that some time after 1987 she 
completed all of the requirements for a Master's of Arts 
degree in Liberal Studies, except the thesis. These actions 
demonstrate that despite Todish's mental impairments, she 
retained an ability to understand her legal rights and to 
institute legal action within the six-year statutory period. 
 
Todish asserts that the District Court erred in granting 
summary judgment because her "lengthy (handwritten) 
affidavit supporting her complaint shows she understood 
little about the legal points of her case." Appellant's brief at 
14. This assertion reflects a misunderstanding of the 
applicable test for insanity under the tolling statute. 
Whether Todish understood the legal points of her case, or 
even knew how or when to file a civil claim against CIGNA, 
does not determine whether she was insane for tolling 
purposes. See Kyle, 44 N.J. at 113, 207 A.2d at 521 
(articulating test for insanity as "such a condition of mental 
derangement as actually prevents the sufferer from 
understanding his legal rights or instituting legal action"). 
Rather, the lack of understanding that would render her 
"insane" must have derived from her mental illness and 
placed her at a level of understanding below that of the 
usual plaintiff, of whom we require diligence in discovering 
the legal wrong. See Tevis v. Tevis, 79 N.J. 422, 433, 400 
A.2d 1189, 1195 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1979) (holding that statute 
of limitations was not tolled under the insanity provision 
where plaintiff had "apparently suffered substantial injuries 
but she was not incapacitated or prevented by her physical 
or mental trauma from pursuing her legal rights"); cf. New 
Castle County v. Halliburton Nus Corp., 111 F.3d 1116, 
1124 (3d Cir. 1997) ("[A] claim accrues upon awareness of 
actual injury, not upon awareness that the injury 
constitutes a legal wrong."). 
 
As we explained above, Todish's actions, including her 
attempt to find legal counsel for her grievance hearing with 
Eastern Airlines, her attempts to obtain a transcript of that 
hearing, her filing multiple times for Social Security 
benefits, her request for reconsideration of the Social 
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Security denial, and her hiring of an attorney on a 
contingency fee basis to represent her on appeal of the 
Social Security denial, demonstrate that her mental 
impairments did not prevent her from understanding her 
legal rights or from instituting legal action, and Todish 
accordingly does not meet the test for insanity under the 
tolling provision. 
 
Todish also argues that because she was found mentally 
disabled by the Social Security Administration for purposes 
of Social Security benefits, she was necessarily"insane" 
within the meaning of the New Jersey statue. See 
Appellant's brief at 17. Again, this simply is not so. Under 
the Social Security Act, an individual is considered disabled 
if she is unable "to engage in any substantial gainful 
activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or 
mental impairment . . . which has lasted or can be expected 
to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months." 
42 U.S.C. S 423(d)(1)(A). There is no doubt that Todish had 
difficulty holding a steady job due to her mental 
impairments, but the mere fact that she was unable to 
engage in substantial gainful activity does not create a 
genuine issue of material fact concerning her ability to 
understand and pursue her legal rights. 
 
In the alternative, Todish argues that under Bowler v. 
Fidelity & Casualty Co. of New York, 53 N.J. 313, 250 A.2d 
580 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1969), she should be permitted to 
pursue her case despite the running of the statute of 
limitations. In Bowler, the New Jersey Supreme Court held 
that a defendant insurance company was equitably 
estopped from relying on the statute of limitations where 
the insurance company had ceased payment of benefits, 
which it knew to be covered by the insured's policy, without 
notifying the insured or requesting additional medical proof 
for further coverage. See Bowler, 53 N.J. at 329-30, 250 
A.2d at 589. The plaintiff in Bowler was the holder of an 
accident insurance policy. His policy provided for 200 
consecutive weeks of payment in the event of total 
disability. If, after the 200 weeks, he was permanently and 
totally disabled, the insurance company was obligated to 
make 600 additional weeks of payments. Bowler suffered a 
severe leg bone fracture in an accidental fall. The fracture 
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resulted in a bone infection that rotted away part of his 
bone, creating pus that drained from an ulcer in the outer 
surface of his leg. 
 
The defendant insurance company paid Bowler his 
weekly disability benefits, with periodic confirmation by 
Bowler's physician, for 199 of the initial 200 weeks. After 
the 199th payment, however, despite "a clear case of duty 
to pay the 200th-week benefit" and without any explanation 
or request for further evidence of disability from Bowler, the 
insurance company abruptly ceased payment. Bowler, 53 
N.J. at 329, 250 A.2d at 589. The New Jersey Supreme 
Court held that the insurance company's conduct, 
apparently stemming from a fear that it would be obligated 
to pay the additional 600 weeks if it were to pay the 200th 
week, was "so inequitable and unconscionable as to bar 
reliance upon the statutory limitation on the institute of 
suit on the policy." Bowler, 53 N.J. at 330, 250 A.2d at 
589. 
 
In contrast to Bowler, Todish does not allege, nor do we 
find any evidence of, unconscionable conduct on the part of 
CIGNA in this case. Todish does not claim that CIGNA 
defrauded her or that she relied on any misleading or 
deceitful misrepresentation made by CIGNA. Instead, the 
undisputed facts evince that CIGNA advised Todish in 
writing that if she wished to claim benefits beyond 
September 1984, she was required to furnish medical proof 
of her continued total disability. Further, CIGNA provided 
Todish with a form that explained her right to request a 
review of the denial under ERISA. Therefore, even if, as 
Todish asserts, she would have been entitled to payment 
had she furnished the required medical proof, CIGNA is not 
equitably estopped from relying on the statute of limitations 
in this case. See Tevis, 79 N.J. at 433, 40 A.2d at 1196 
(holding that even though a husband's conduct in battering 
his wife was "grotesque and inexcusable," the husband was 
not equitably estopped from relying on the statute of 
limitations in defense of his wife's civil claim, absent 
evidence that he deceived or defrauded his wife into 
forestalling the filing of her suit). 
 
As articulated by the New Jersey courts, the statute of 
limitations serves several goals, including "the security and 
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stability of human affairs created by eventual repose . . . 
[and] the prospective defendants' ability to respond to 
allegations made against them." Jones v. Jones, 242 N.J. 
Super. 195, 203, 576 A.2d 316, 320 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. 
Div. 1990) (citations omitted); see Galligan v. Westfield 
Centre Serv., Inc., 82 N.J. 188, 191-92, 412 A.2d 122, 124 
(N.J. Sup. Ct. 1980). These goals are best served in this 




For the reasons stated, we agree with the District Court 
that the evidence presented at summary judgment 
demonstrates that "Todish was not so immobilized by her 
mental illness that a tolling of the statute of limitations 
should occur." Todish v. CIGNA Corp., No. 96-373, slip op. 
at 6 (D.N.J. May 6, 1998). Accordingly, we will affirm the 
order of the District Court. 
 
A True Copy: 
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